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ABSTRACT 
The  present  study  broadly attempts  to  analyze  the  role  of  Fiscal  Responsibility  and  Budget 
Management Act in restoring fiscal balance in India. It analyses the need for fiscal rules and 
constraints in India. The study aims at finding out the major factor behind rising fiscal imbalance 
in India and to examine whether there is an electoral motive towards high fiscal deficit to GDP 
ratio or not. It also analyzes the effectiveness of various measures undertaken at the central and 
state level to  inculcate  fiscal  discipline in  the  fiscal  management.  The study also makes an 
attempt to do a critical in depth reviews of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management 
Act and make an attempt at examining effectiveness and suitability of FRBM Act through a 
quantitative analysis. It also makes an attempt to suggest improvements in the fiscal monitoring 
mechanism in India. We employ Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method to examine the impact of 
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act on fiscal deficit in India using the data for the 
period 1980-81 to 2008-09. The regression results indicates that FRBM Act does not have a 
significant effect on the Gross Fiscal Deficit (GFD) to GDP ratio where as GDP (at factor cost) 
growth rate has a significant negative effect on the GFD to GDP ratio.      
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal policy rule is defined as a permanent constraint on fiscal policy expressed in terms of a 
summary  of  fiscal  performance,  such  as  the  budget  deficit,  borrowing,  debt  or  a  major 
component thereof (Kopits and Symansky, 1998). The need for fiscal policy rule arises due to the 
impact of the fiscal policy on stabilization and growth objectives, the sustainability of the fiscal 
policy stance, and the linkages between fiscal and other policy instruments. Loose fiscal policy, 
especially when financed by printing money, can lead to high and volatile inflation. When the  
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government borrows to finance a looser fiscal position, the greater demand for loanable funds 
can reduce private investment by raising interest rates. Under a floating exchange rate, higher 
interest rates will also tend to attract foreign capital, leading to an appreciation of the exchange 
rate, which will also crowd out exports. Loose fiscal policy may not be sustainable. Continuously 
rising debt levels creates uncertainty (regarding inflation, a disorderly depreciation, price and 
foreign  trade  restrictions,  or  large  tax  increases).  These  states  of  affairs  reduce  private 
investment as they cause investors to wait and see. Loose  fiscal policy may also make the 
economic  environment  more  volatile  (e.g.,  by  recurrent,  and  ill-timed,  bursts  of  fiscal 
contraction  and  expansion),  which  can  weaken  investment  by  increasing  risk  and  focusing 
investment on the short run. Fiscal policy rule through its fiscal adjustment policy can help 
mitigate  cyclicality  (recurrent  recessions and  booms),  reduce large external current  account 
imbalances, and contain inflation. During capital account crisis, fiscal adjustment can restore 
confidence,  ease  financing  constraints,  and  support  the  growth.  Fiscal  adjustment  may  be 
needed to facilitate external adjustment, especially to reduce excessive current account deficits 
or surpluses. A successful fiscal adjustment durably and efficiently improves the fiscal position. 
Success  depends  on  a  range  of  factors  especially,  the  timing,  speed,  size,  and  quality  of 
adjustment  (IMF,  1995).    Accordingly,  fiscal  policy  rules  –  if  well  designed  and  properly 
implemented are viewed as potentially useful techniques for emerging market economies.  
 
The present study is a modest attempt to examine the role of Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management Act in restoring fiscal balance in India from 1980-81 to 2008-09. The econometric 
methodology used in this study is time series analyses with OLS test. These techniques allow us 
to find impact of FRBM Act on fiscal deficit in India.  Data on the relevant variables between 
1980-81 to 2008-09 is used. The remaining of the paper is organized into six sections including 
introduction. Section-II describes the rationale for fiscal responsibility in India. Section-III makes 
an evolution of India’s central and state government measure to inculcate fiscal discipline and 
analyses their effectiveness. Section-IV discusses briefly the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management Act India. This section includes FRBM Act in terms of fiscal deficit and rationale of 
fiscal  deficit.    Section-V  makes  an  attempt  to  do  a  critical  in  depth  reviews  of  the  Fiscal 
Responsibility  and  Budget  Management  Act  and  make  an  attempt  at  examining  the 
effectiveness and suitability of FRBM act through a quantitative analysis. Section-VI concludes 
and suggests the measure to improve in the fiscal monitoring mechanism in India.  
 
2. Rationale for Fiscal Responsibility in India  
In  India  rationale  for  fiscal  policy  rule  is  in  part  attributable  to  the  deterioration  in  fiscal 
performance. India has done a tremendous economic growth within these two decades. Its GDP 
growth rate has become 9 percent but its sustainability has been in question, first with the 1991 
fiscal-balance of payments crisis, and then again after 1997-98, when fiscal deficits became 10 
percent of GDP range and government debt grew. High deficit, unproductive expenditure and 
tax distortion have constrained the economy from realizing its full growth potential. To make 
this economic growth sustainable with macroeconomic stability, fiscal policy rule is a critical 
component (Economic survey, 2007). 
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In India persisting fiscal imbalance has been a major macro-economic concern to policy makers. 
The combined fiscal deficit of the centre and the states which was 9.3 percent of GDP in the 
crisis year of 1990-91 dropped to 6.3 percent in 1996-97 before creeping back up to 9.0 per cent 
in 1998-99. The fiscal deficit had remained at over 9.0 percent until 2002-03 and has since been 
on a downward shift declining to 4.2 percent in 2007-08. Due to the global economic crisis it is 
again estimated to up to 10.2 percent for 2009-10 (Budget Estimate).  Similarly, the combined 
revenue deficit of the centre and the states which was 4.2 percent in the crisis year of 1990-91 
and had declined to 3.2 percent by 1992-93 grew to an alarming level of 6.9 percent by 2001-02. 
Like fiscal deficit, revenue deficit too showed a welcome downward shift since 2002-03 declining 
to 0.2 percent for 2007-08. Due to the global economic crisis it is again estimated to up to 5.5 
percent for 2009-10 (Budget Estimate).  
 
In India growing deficit, not only deserves concern, but the composition of this deficit and the 
way it is being financed deserve concern because, the impact of fiscal deficit depends on it. 
Growing revenue deficit in India is a major concern because more and more revenue deficit 
implies preemption of private saving for government current consumption which tends to crowd 
out private investment without corresponding increase in capital spending by the government. 
It is also recognized that since the 1990s primary deficit has turned negative, implying that 
states are borrowing to meet their current expenditure or significant part of the fiscal deficit is 
due to the burden of the serving the past debt. 
  
Widespread  deterioration  in  fiscal  position  with  associated  impact  on  fiscal  sustainability, 
macroeconomic vulnerability and economic growth led an emerging, consensus to adopt fiscal 
reform to improve fiscal responsibility. In 2003 the Central Government of India enacted Fiscal 
Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act on the presumption that fiscal deficit is the 
key parameter adversely affecting all other macroeconomic variable. It put statutory ceilings on 
Central Government’s borrowings, debt and deficits. Now all the major States have enacted 
Fiscal Responsibility Law except West Bengal and Sikkim. 
 
3. Evolution of Central and State Government Measure to Inculcate  
    Fiscal Discipline and their Effectiveness 
 
In India fiscal policy rule is not a new concept. For more than fifty years since the inception of 
the constitution, government debt and borrowing programmes for the central as well as the 
state governments in India were managed without any explicit targets or rules except for the 
constitutional provisions under articles 292 and 293. Apart from this the governments of India 
time to time have taken different fiscal incentives to inculcate fiscal discipline. 
 
Constitutional Provisions on Public Debt 
Dr. Ambedkar
1 highlighted the importance of Parliamentary Legislation to control borrowing in 
Constituent Assembly debates on articles 292 and 293. He referred to the need for an “Annual 
                                                 
1 Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the man behind the drafting and formation of the Indian Constitution.  
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Debt Act”
2. Article 292 of the constitution of India contemplates limiting government borrowing 
through a parliament law. It mandates “borrowing by government of India the executive power 
of the union extends to borrowing upon the security of the consolidated fund of India within 
such limits. Under Article 266 any disbursement from the consolidated fund of India mandatorily 
requires parliamentary approval. Similarly article 293 provides that the legislation of a state can 
fix limits on borrowing by a state as well as limits on guarantee given by it. 
  
Article 292 and 293 of the constitution covers only the Public Debt. This is forming part of 
consolidated fund of India, as this alone can be deemed to be “borrowing upon the consolidated 
fund of India”. Other liabilities forming part of the Public Account such as post office saving 
deposits,  deposits  under  small  saving  certificates  and  provident  funds  are  not  recorded  as 
“borrowing  upon  the  security  of  consolidated  fund  of  India”  (IMF,  2001).  Constitutional 
provision on public debt is sufficient enough to control total liabilities of the government. 
 
RBI Attempts towards Controlling Borrowing 
In September 1994 an agreement (without legislated sanction) was signed between the central 
government and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to phase out the system of ad-hoc treasury bills 
by 1997- 98. Adhoc treasury bills facilitated automatic monetization of the budget deficit. This 
adhoc Treasury bill was replaced with Ways and Means Advances. 
 
 
Eleventh  Finance  commission  Provision  of  Extended  Ways  and  Means  Act  to  Control 
Borrowing   
Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC) recommends for extended ways and means advance and 
additional open market borrowings in order to give the incentive for better performance.  The 
scope and dimension of these facilities were decided by the central government, bearing in 
mind  their  macro-economic implications  and  the  centre’s  fiscal  position.  The  facilities  were 
linked to the monitor able fiscal reform programme drawn up by the state.  Eleven States signed 
confidential  Memoranda  of  Understanding  (MoU)  with  the  central  government  in  1999-00, 
which promised fiscal reforms in return for advances of tax shares (Government of India, 2000). 
The  incentive  given  under  this  Extended  Ways  and  Means  Act  (EWMA)  was  not  enough 
encouraging for better fiscal performance.  
 
Government of India’s Debt-Swap Scheme to Control the Burden of Debt 
Government  of  India  (GoI)  formulated  a  Debt  Swap  Scheme  (DWS)  realizing  the  mounting 
burden  of  interest  payments  on  the  states,  and  to  supplement  their  efforts  towards  fiscal 
                                                 
2 In the constituent assembly debates article 292 of the constitution was referred to as article 268. Dr. 
Ambedkar had observed “that the borrowing power of the executive shall be subject to such limitations 
as  Parliament  may  by  law  prescribe.  If  parliament  does  not  make  a  law  it  is  certainly  the  fault  of 
Parliament and I should have thought it is very difficult to imagine any future Parliament which will not 
pay sufficient or serious attention to this matter and enact a law. Under the article 268 even concede that 
there might be an Annual Debt Act made by Parliament prescribing or limiting the power of the executive 
as to how much they can borrow within that year.”  
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management.  The  scheme  was  in  operation  from  2002-03  to  2004-05. These  additional 
recoveries  enabled  the  centre  to  repay  some  of  its  high  cost  debt  to  NSSF.  The  central 
government used the proceeds of debt swap to effect prepayment of its debt to the National 
Small Saving Fund (NSSF) at lower interest rate. This had the effect of bringing down centre’s 
overall debt as well as its effective interest rate. 
 
The debt-swap scheme was only a small step in the direction of dealing with the unsustainable 
deficit  faced  by  the  states. It  covered  only 15  percent  of their total  debt. Here,  again,  the 
scheme  merely  aimed  at  reducing  the  cost  of  servicing  the  debt,  and  not  extinguishing  it. 
Though there was a benefits of Debt-Swap Scheme in terms of reducing pressure on the state by 
way of lower interest rate but it lead to loss of revenue for centre as the high cost loan were 
brought to lower level (Government of India, 2005).  
 
Finance Commission’s various Debt-Relief Schemes to Control Debt Burden of States and to 
Bring Fiscal Balance 
Tenth Finance Commission recommended debt relief scheme in two parts, namely, (i) specific 
relief for state with high fiscal stress (ii) a scheme for general debt relief for all states. The 
second one was linked to fiscal performance. Improvement of fiscal management was measured 
by comparing the ratio revenue receipt (including devolution and grants from centre) with the 
total revenue expenditure in a given year with the average of corresponding ratios in the three 
immediately preceding years. The performance of each state was measured against its own 
performance. Twice                                                                                                                   the excess 
of the ratio over the average ratio of fiscal improvement during the preceding three year was 
recommended  for  relief  on  loans  contracted  during  the period  1989-95  and failing  due  for 
repayment after 31
st March 1995. 
 
The improvement of fiscal management was measured by comparing the ratio revenue receipt 
(including devolution and grants from centre) with the total revenue expenditure in a given year 
with the average of corresponding ratios in the three immediately preceding years. When the 
devolution  and  grants  from  centre  was  increasing  the  revenue  receipt  to  total  revenue 
expenditure ratio was showing an improvement but it was not an actual improvement of fiscal 
management of state. 
 
Eleventh  Finance  Commission  (EFC)  did  not  consider  any  special  debt  relief  for  the  fiscally 
stressed states, but continued general debt relief of Tenth Finance Commission. EFC enhanced 
general incentive from 10 percent to 25 percent. In addition to it instead factors of two, a 
factors of five was applied on the ratio of fiscal improvement in terms of revenue receipts to 
total revenue expenditure. In the calculation of revenue receipts, the revenue deficit grants 
recommended by EFC under article 275 were excluded. 
 
Though  under  EFC  in  the  calculation  of  revenue  receipts,  the  revenue  deficit  grants  were 
excluded still devolution from centre remained as a part of revenue receipts. So when the  
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devolution from centre was increasing the revenue receipt to total revenue expenditure ratio 
was showing an improvement but it was not an actual improvement of fiscal management of 
state. 
 
Twelfth  Finance  Commission  also  recommended  for  debt  relief  scheme  but,  it  also 
recommended that each state  has  to enact  Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) with  a target  to 
eliminate  revenue  deficit  and  reducing  fiscal  deficit  by  2008-09.  Enacting  FRL  became  a 
precondition for availing debt relief. A debt write off scheme became linked with the reduction 
of revenue deficit of the state. The quantum of repayment was linked to the absolute amount 
by which the revenue deficit is reduced in each successive year during award period. Fiscal 
performance measured with reference to the revenue deficit/ revenue surplus as worked out in 
absolute numbers by taking an average of three years, viz, 2001-02 (Actual), 2002-03 (Actual) 
and 200-04 (Revised Estimate). This average was taken as the base year for 2003-04. 
 
The scheme of debt-write off linked to revenue deficit reduction recommended by the TWFC 
favored state with low base year revenue deficit. The relatively better of state received large 
benefits from debt write-off scheme, though they had relatively lower revenue deficit. Thus, the 
state with larger deficit gained less in terms of debt write-off in terms of the overall transfers 
they  received.  This  did  not  induce  them  to  undertake  the  fiscal  adjustment.  It  encouraged 
creative  accounting  while  preparing  budget.    The  scheme  of  debt  write  off  which  was 
recommended by the TWFC commission guided more by the need for fiscal consolidation rather 
than providing relief to debt stressed poor state (Rao and Jena, 2005).  Interest payments on 
special securities issued to NSSF, which constitute more than half of the total interest payments 
obligations in a number of state kept out of the purview of Debt Swap Scheme and the Debt 
Consolidation and Relief Facility (DCRF) recommended by the Eleventh and Twelfth Finance 
Commission respectively.  
 
Debt Consolidation and Relief Facility (DCRF) under Thirteenth Finance        Commission 
The Thirteenth Commission has recommended two debt relief measures to be extended to all 
state. Firstly, it has recommended that the interest rates on loans from National Small Savings 
Fund (NSSF) to state contracted till the end of 2006-07 and outstanding as at the end of 2009-10 
be reset at interest rate of 9 percent. Thirteenth Finance Commission recommended for the 
structural reform in NSSF to make it more market linked. The second debt relief recommended 
by  the  Commission  is  write-off  of  central  loans  to  state  that  are  administered  by  central 
ministries other than Ministry of Finance outstanding as at the end of 2009-10. The Commission 
has also recommended that any further loans under Centrally Sponsored Schemes should be 
completely  avoided.  The  Commission  has  also  recommended  extension  of  the  debt 
consolidation facility recommended by the Twelfth Finance Commission to state that have not 
yet availed this benefit. 
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Eleventh Finance Commission Provision of Fiscal Reform Facility (FRF) to  State 
On April 2000, Eleventh Finance Commission drew a monitor able fiscal reform programme, 
aimed at reduction of revenue deficit of the state. It recommended the manner in which the 
grants to the state to cover the assessed deficit in their non plan revenue account may be linked 
to progresses in implementing programme. EFC identified growth of tax revenue, growth of non 
tax  revenue,  growth  of  non-plan  revenue  expenditure  on  salaries  and  allowances,  interest 
payments  and  reduction  of  subsidies  as  the  five  indicators  as  a  measure  of  the  fiscal 
performance of the state and recommended weights for each. As recommended by EFC, an 
incentive fund in the form of Fiscal Reform Facility (FRF) was set up by Ministry of Finance 
leaving 85 percent of the revenue deficit grant recommended by EFC to be released to the state 
without linking it with performance. The remaining 15 percent was linked with improvement in 
fiscal performance. While introducing the scheme of FRF, Government of India prescribed a 
single monitorable indicator for the purpose of making releases from the incentive funds. The 
indicator expected each state to achieve a minimum improvement of 5 percent in revenue 
deficit/surplus as a proportion of its revenue receipts each year till 2004-05 measured with 
reference to the base year 1999-2000. The revenue deficit was to be inclusive of contingent 
liabilities and subsidies due to public sector enterprises (Government of India, 2000).  
 
Only a minor portion of the grants of non plan revenue account was linked to fiscal performance 
so it did not give much incentive to state towards fiscal responsibility. 
 
Medium Term Fiscal Reform Programs (MTFRPs)  
In 2000-01 the finance ministry issued guide lines to  state for Medium Term Fiscal Reform 
Programs (MTFRPs). The MTFRP had dual aim of reducing wasteful expenditure (cutting low 
priority  spending)  and  improving  tax  collection  or  improving  the  efficiency  of  the  tax 
administration. The MTFRPs required the state to make time bound reform in four areas like, 
fiscal, power and public sector and budgetary. The main objective of MTFRPs were to bring the 
consolidated fiscal deficit to sustainable levels by 2005 and to bring down debt-GDP ratio as well 
as interest payment to revenue expenditure rate over the medium term. The MTFRPs finalized 
for nine states, namely Nagaland, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa, Kerala, Arunachal Pradesh, 
West Bengal, Himanchal Pradesh and Manipur. Despite the operation of Fiscal Reform Facilities 
(FRFs) state achieved 6.23 percent reductions in Revenue Deficit/Revenue Receipt ratio by 2002-
03 as against the targeted 15 percent reduction over the base year 1999-00. In 2003-04, the 
position deteriorated by 1.89 percent. The aggregate fiscal deficit of state actually increased 
from 2.35 percent of GDP in 1993-94 to 3.5 percent in 2004-05. Similarly state revenue deficit 
increased marginally from 0.45 percent of GDP in 1993-94 to 1 percent of GDP in 2004-05. The 
outstanding debt to GDP ratio of state increased substantially from 21.79 percent of GDP in 
1993-94 to 31.15 percent in 2002-03. FRF did not play a significant role in bringing about an 
improvement in state fiscal position in past five years. On the basis of performance five states 
classified  as  consistently  improving  (Kerala,  U.P,  Goa,  Sikkim  and  Chhatisgarh).  Some  state 
classified as consistently deteriorating (Gujrat, H.P, Uttarachhal and Jharkhand). Twelve states 
showed initial improvements and then deteriorated (W.B, Rajastan, Punjab, Bihar, T.N, Manipur,  
 
 
8
M.P, Assam, Haryana, Karnataka, Tripura and Meghalaya). The remaining state were initially 
deteriorating and then improved such as, Maharastra, J&K, A.P, Mizoram, Nagaland, Arunachal 
Pradesh and Orissa (Government of India, 2005). 
 
There were certain reasons, why MTFRPs could not achieve its target. There was a design failure 
in prescribing a uniform 5 percent improvement in the ratio for all state. If state start off with 
larger base year deficits, it was relatively easier for them to make huge improvements. In the 
initial years MTFRPs target were set in terms of revenue deficit as a per cent of total revenues of 
state and when transfer to state declined, the ratio went up. The single monitor able factor was 
needed to be removed. The definition of revenue deficit was not uniform for all state. The size 
of fund, which was promised to be given to a state, as an incentive for achieving targeted 
reduction in fiscal deficit was insignificant, so could not give sufficient incentive to state to 
restore  fiscal  balance  (Rao  and  Jena,  2005).  The  Twelfth  Finance  Commission  (TWFC)  and 
Thirteenth Finance Commission recognized this problem and it recommended for linking the 
debt write off to improvement in revenue deficit. It has a lot merit as there is a direct link to 
absolute in the revenue deficit. The debt relief will be available, only if state enacts appropriate 
legislations to bring down the revenue deficit to zero and commit to reducing the fiscal deficit in 
a phased manner. MTFRPs was an important development in managing state finances, as the 
state started thinking about fiscal matters on a medium term framework. 
 
Restructuring the System of Fiscal Transfer towards Fiscal Responsibility under various Finance 
Commissions in the process of Tax Devolution 
Even though the system of transfer is always guided by equalization and efficiency criteria, but 
still an objective for providing incentive to state towards achieving fiscal discipline has been 
always taken care of by different Finance Commissions (FCs).  In the tax devolution process time 
to  time  different  Finance  Commissions  have  taken  certain  criteria  and  have  assigned  them 
certain weights, considering the urgency of fiscal consolidation. 
 
(a) Tax Effort: Tenth Finance Commission (TFC) for the first time took tax effort as criteria for tax 
devolution to state. It worked as an incentive among the state to raise tax potential capacity. 
Tax effort was measured by the ratio of per capita own tax revenue of a state to its per capita 
income. It was weighted by the inverse of per capita income. It ensured that if a poorer state 
exploited its tax base as much as a richer state, it got an additional consideration in the formula. 
TFC  gave  10  percent  weight  to  tax  effort  criteria.  Eleventh  Finance  Commission  (EFC)  also 
recommended this criterion but it reduced the weight of inverse of per capita income from 1 per 
cent  to  0.5  percent.  EFC  gave  5  percent  weight  to  tax  effort  criteria.  Twelfth  Finance 
Commission (TWFC) also took tax effort criteria for tax devolution and it also raised the weight 
to  7.5  percent considering  the  urgency  of  fiscal  consolidation  (Government of  India,  2005). 
Thirteenth Finance Commission dropped this criterion for tax devolution (Government of India, 
2010). 
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(b)  Fiscal  Discipline:  Eleventh  Finance  Commission  for  the  first  time  introduced  the  fiscal 
discipline criteria for tax devolution. The index of fiscal discipline was arrived at by relating 
improvement in the ratio of own revenue receipts of a state to its total revenue expenditure to 
average ratio across all the state. The ratio so computed was used to measure the improvement 
in the index of fiscal discipline in reference period in comparison to a base period. TWFC also 
recommended fiscal discipline criteria for tax devolution to state. Fiscal discipline criteria got the 
relative  weight  age  of  7.5  percent  in  both  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Finance  Commission. 
Twelfth Finance Commission had worked out the index with the reference period of 2000-01 to 
2002-03 and the base period of 1993-94 to 1995-96. These criteria provided an incentive for 
better fiscal management. Thirteenth Finance Commission have retained this criterion and have 
worked out the index of fiscal discipline with 2005-06 to 2007-08 as reference years and 2001-
02 to 2003-04 as the base years. The own revenue receipts of a state include own tax revenues 
and thus, the criterion of fiscal discipline also captures the tax effort of state. Thirteenth Finance 
Commission  has,  therefore,  dropped  the  use  of  tax  effort  as  a  separate  criterion.  Twelfth 
Finance Commission assigned a weight of 7.5 percent each to fiscal discipline and tax effort. 
Thus, the combined weight assigned by Twelfth Finance Commission to these two criteria was 
15 per cent. There is a strong case to incentives state following fiscal prudence, particularly in 
the  context  of  the  need  to  return  to  the  path  of  fiscal  correction.  Thirteenth  Finance 
Commission,  therefore,  assigned  a  weight  of  17.5  percent  to  fiscal  discipline.  Under  this 
criterion,  if  all  state  improved  their  respective  ratios  of  own  revenue  to  total  revenue 
expenditure, then the state with relatively higher improvement than the average receives higher 
transfers. Similarly, if the ratio has deteriorated in all state, then state with lower deterioration 
than the average receives higher transfers (Government of India, 2010). 
 
Although the Finance Commission has earned appreciation as a useful fiscal institution for a 
federation, the transfer system that has been operating on the ground is marked by features 
that are widely perceived to be not very conducive to fiscal discipline among state. Multiplicity 
of transfer channels with little effective coordination among them and mediation of capital 
transfers (loans from the centre) without adequate regard for the repaying capacity of the 
recipient governments are the major road block on the way of achieving fiscal discipline. The 
allocation of the other component of the Finance Commission’s transfers (share of central taxes, 
which accounts for the bulk of the “statutory transfers”) is decided on the basis of formulae 
which are also believed to have generated wrong signals for fiscal discipline. However, the 
emphasis is on equity rather than efficiency. While the transfer formulae also contain weights 
for efficiency (“tax effort”, fiscal self-reliance etc.) their effects are often perceived to be weak 
and subdued by equity factors. Even though criteria like tax effort, fiscal discipline has been 
taken  in  the  tax  devolution  process  under  different  Finance  Commission’s  to  achieve  fiscal 
consolidation; it could not act as an incentive to the state for going towards fiscal stability. 
Though these criteria constitute only a minor portion of the total devolution process, it could 
not have any significant effect on the efficiency or on the equity among the state (Rao and Jena, 
2005). Thirteenth Finance Commission have taken Fiscal Discipline criteria and has given the 
weight of 17.5 percent, in the tax devolution process to achieve fiscal consolidation, under the  
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presumption that it will act as an incentive to the state for going towards fiscal stability. Though 
this criterion constitutes only a minor portion of the total devolution process, it will not have 
any significant effect on the efficiency or on the equity among the state  
 
The conflict between equity and efficiency in the transfer formulae is often overplayed as both 
can be taken care of simultaneously if the revenue gaps of the state are assessed normatively. 
However, for practical reasons, application of norms has not proceeded far and it may not be 
unfair to say that the persistence of gap filling approach in the Finance Commission’s transfers 
noted above continues to generate perverse incentives for fiscal indiscipline among state. With 
such  a  transfer  system,  the  states  have  found  it  profitable  to  undertake  expenditure 
commitments  exceeding  their  available  revenues  on  the  expectation  that  the  gap  would 
ultimately be made up by the Finance Commission. The design of statutory transfers thus has 
tended  to  create  a  bias  towards  improvident  budgeting  by  “legitimizing  incipient  deficits” 
caused by inadequate revenue effort and imprudent expenditure decisions of the past. 
 
Contrary to the scheme of inter Governmental transfer that was apparently contemplated in the 
Indian  Constitution  with  Finance  Commission  as  the  chief  mediator,  central  funds  are 
transferred to state in India through other channels as well, of which Plan transfers constitute 
the main component. Some transfers are made directly by central ministries for implementing 
Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS). Initially, central assistance for the state plans used to be 
project-specific. In 1969, this system was replaced by the Gadgil formula whereby support for 
state plans was extended out of central budget in the form of grant and loan with the share of 
individual state determined largely on the basis of population, and, in part, with reference to 
relative income levels. Some weight was given to tax effort but its effect was submerged by the 
other factors. An element of discretion was provided in the form of weight age for special 
factors.  In  the  pursuit  of  national  objectives  like  literacy  program,  the  Centrally  Sponsored 
Schemes (CSS) under the ‘Plan’ which are implemented through the state but are not all funded 
fully  by  the  centre  adding  to  their  expenditure  commitment.  Often  they  carry  a  matching 
component, casting an additional burden on the state budgets and distorting their priorities. 
Finally, resources transferred to state in the form of loans are made up largely of ‘plan loans’. 
These  are  the  on-lending  by  the  centre  from  its  own  borrowing  constituting  the  largest 
component of funds flowing from the centre to the state as loans. These, together with the 
system of state borrowing from the market mediated by the Centre at uniform rates of interest 
and maturity, taking no account of the debt sustainability of individual state or their varying 
creditworthiness,  constituted  a  potent  source  of  budgetary  instability  of  state.  Unless  the 
distortions in the fiscal federal system are removed, any attempts at fiscal correction at the 
state level  are  doomed  to failure  (Anand,  Sen  and  Bagchi, 2001).  There is lack  of  effective 
coordination  between  Finance  Commission  and  Planning  Commission.  As  a  result,  it  was 
possible for a state to underplay its resource availability before the Finance Commission but 
present a different picture before the Planning Commission to obtain approval for its plan of a 
size unwarranted by available funds.   
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Restructuring  the  System  of  Fiscal  Transfer  towards  Fiscal  Responsibility  under  Planning 
Commissions Transfer to State 
In the fourth and fifth five year plan planning commission transferred financial assistance to the 
state on basis of Gadgil
3 formula. Under Gadgil formula basically population, per capita income, 
tax efforts, ongoing irrigation and power projects and special problems were taken as the bases 
for financial transfers. Under these formula tax efforts was taken as indicator to achieve fiscal 
responsibility but though it constitute only 10 percent of total financial assistance it could not 
achieve its objective. For 1991-92 annual plans some modification took place in formula and in 
the  modified  formula  population,  per  capita  income,  financial  arrangement  and  special 
development problems were taken as the bases for financial transfers. Under these formula 
financial  arrangement  was  taken  as  the  base  to  achieve  fiscal  responsibility  but  though  it 
constitute only 5 per cent of total financial assistance it could not achieve its objective. Again in 
eight five year plan some modification took place and financial assistance to the state was made 
on the basis of Gadgil Mukherjee formula. Under this formula basically population, per capita 
income,  performance  and  special  development  programmes  were  taken  as  the  bases  for 
financial transfers. Performance base was given 7.5 percent weight of total assistance. It took 
tax effort, financial management; progress in the form of national objectives as the indicator of 
performance base. Though this performance base constitutes only a minor portion of the total 
transfer, it did not have any significant effect on the efficiency or on equity among the state. 
Under Eleventh Plan Central assistance to general category state is provided by Gadgil formula. 
 
In  the case  of  plan  assistance  for  general  (non-special) category  state,  30  per  cent  of  plan 
assistance was given as grant and 70 percent as loan.  In the case of special category state 10 
percent of plan assistance was given as loan and 90 percent as grant. Interest rate charged by 
the central government on the plan loan to state, which has been, in the past sometimes 300 to 
400 basis points higher than the cost of funds to centre. Plan grant are not interest free grants. 
While at least two-thirds of the plan expenditure have always been debt-financed (since 1974-
75), in 1998-99, borrowings of the state meant for plan financing reached an unprecedented 
high of 139 percent of plan expenditure.  
 
                                                 
3 The Gadgil formula is due to D.R. Gadgil, the social scientist and the first critic of Indian Planning. It was 
evolved in 1969 for determining the allocation of central assistance for state plans in India. Gadgil formula 
was adopted for distribution of plan assistance during Fourth and Fifth Five Year Plans According to this 
formula, allocation for states was based on 60 per cent of population, 10 per cent of per capita income, 10 
per cent of tax effort, 10 per cent of on-going irrigation and power projects and the remaining 10 per cent 
of special problems. This formula was modified in 1980  and  the modified  formula was the basis for 
allocation during the Sixth and Seventh Five Year Plans. As per the modified formula, the total weightage 
for on-going schemes and per capita income was 20 percent. 
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Several  features  of  plan  financing  and  plan  transfers  tended  to  generate  imbalance  in  the 
revenue budget of the state, of which the  following deserve mention: 1) Approval of state plans 
by the Planning Commission in terms of the ‘outlay’ without specification of its  revenue and 
capital components. 2) The practice of the Planning Commission to approve large state plans 
even when a state failed to achieve the targets set in the preceding year by a large margin. 3) 
Plan, non-plan dichotomy in budget accounting with the revenue component of a Plan project 
shown under ‘Plan’ for the given plan period but under ‘non-plan account’ thereafter. This 
added to the state's ‘committed’ expenditure. It also provided a built-in incentive to launch new 
programs  involving  substantial  expenditure  on  current  account  without  regard  for  the 
consequence for future budgets.  
 
Non Plan Revenue Grant by Thirteenth Finance Commission 
It has been argued that Non-Plan Revenue Deficit (NPRD) grants risk moral hazard by providing 
an  incentive  to  state  to  run  non-plan  revenue  deficits.  In  Thirteenth  Finance  Commission’s 
award there has been a significant reduction in the volume and state-wise incidence of NPRD 
grants, which is to be expected, given the structural improvements in the fiscal position of much 
state, including special category state. In the latter case, in recognition of the effort made to exit 
NPRD,  Thirteenth  Finance  Commission,  deemed  it  appropriate  to  acknowledge  such 
achievement with a performance incentive. Therefore, the need for NPRD grants diminishes as 
structural fiscal reforms are implemented and economic performance improves (Government of 
India, 2010). 
 
4. Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 
 
India enacted the FRBM Act in August 2003.  At central level under the FRBMA the stated 
objective  are  to  ensure  inter-generational  equity  in  fiscal  management,  achieve  fiscal 
sustainability necessary for long-term macroeconomic stability, and improve the transparency in 
the fiscal operations. Similar to most Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs) around the world, the 
FRBMA  establishes  the  broad  framework  for  conducting  fiscal  policy  by  setting  out  both 
procedural as well as numerical rules
4. 
 
FRBM in Terms of Fiscal Indicators  
Under FRBMA the principles of fiscal responsibility have been defined in relation to deficit, 
borrowing and debt and deliberated on the choice, coverage and targets of fiscal indicators. 
Under deficit principles a group of deficit indicators, viz, Revenue Deficit and Gross Fiscal Deficit 
have  been identified and  targeted. FRBM  Act  under  its  rates  set  the  target  for  eliminating 
revenue  deficit  by  2008-09  and  reducing  fiscal  deficit  to  3  percent  of  GDP  by  2008-09.  To 
                                                 
4 Procedural rules refer  to those that define attributes and interaction of participants in the budget 
process aiming to enhance transparency, accountability and fiscal management. Numerical rules instead 
are defined on the basis of overall indicators of fiscal policy such as fiscal balances, debt, revenue, and 
expenditure. 
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achieve the target of revenue deficit and fiscal deficit the central government has to reduce 
revenue deficit by an amount equivalent to 0.5 percent and fiscal deficit by 0.3 percent or more 
of GDP at the end of each financial year, beginning with financial year 2004-05.  
 
Under  borrowing  related  principles,  government  borrowing  from  Reserve  Bank  has  been 
prohibited. It may borrow from it by Way and Means of Advances (WMA) to meet temporary 
excess cash disbursement over cash receipts. Under the debt related principles, a limit on debt 
stock has been prescribed. In India, the FRBM Act sets a limit of 50 percent of GDP on total 
liabilities of the central government. The central government shall not give guarantees to an 
amount exceeding 0.5 percent of GDP in any financial year, beginning with financial year 2004-
05. The central government should not assume additional liabilities (excluding external debt at 
current exchange rate) in excess of 9 percent of GDP for the financial year 2004-05 and in each 
subsequent year, the limit of 9 percent of GDP has to be progressively reduced by at least one 
percent of GDP. The FRBM Act is operationally effective because it seeks year to year ceiling 
rather than a medium term ceiling.  
 
Rationale of Targeting Fiscal Deficit: Fiscal deficit as a proportion of GDP has emerged as a key 
indicator to measure the fiscal health of a country. Fiscal Deficit is measured as the difference 
between  aggregate  disbursements and  revenue and  non  debt  capital  receipts.  Fiscal  deficit 
summarizes  in  a  way  the  total  range  of  public  finances  covering  expenditure  and  revenue. 
Therefore a limit on fiscal deficit has been put. Continued high fiscal deficit are concern for 
several reasons. First this disempowers the government fiscal stance by preempting larger share 
of public resources for debt servicing there by leaving that much less for desirable expenditure 
such as physical infrastructure (e.g. roads, power) and social infrastructure (e.g. education and 
health). This leads to declining ratio of capital expenditure to total expenditure as seen over the 
period 1990-91 to 2002-03 in the case of India. Continued fiscal deficit impact on interest and 
inflation rates depending on how the deficits are financed. If the government borrows in the 
domestic market, it puts pressure on the interest rate. If the government finances the deficit by 
creating high power money, it fuels inflation. In India’s case since deficits are financed by open 
market borrowing, albeit through a preferential Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) window, the risk 
is largely of government borrowing leading to higher interest rate. Mere limiting of its size alone 
may not yield the required result. The impact of fiscal deficit depends upon the composition of 
the fiscal deficit and the way it is being financed.  
 
Rationale of Targeting Revenue Deficit: Revenue deficit is one of the important components of 
fiscal  deficit  it  is  the  difference  between  revenue  expenditure  and  revenue  receipts  which 
indicates increase in liabilities of the government without corresponding increase in assets of 
that  Government.  Such  expenditure  of  borrowed  resources  makes  additional  borrowing 
inevitable in subsequent periods for the servicing of the original borrowing and sets off a vicious 
circle of borrowing. It means that centre and states are using up a significant proportion of 
borrowed  funds  not  for  capital  investment  that  will  yield  future  income  but  for  current 
consumption like payment of salaries, pensions and subsidies. Revenue deficit exacerbate inter  
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temporal equity concerns as they give the pleasure of spending to current generation while 
pressuring on the pain of debt serving to latter generation. Hence, elimination of revenue deficit 
is justified under FRBM Act. 
 
Eliminating  revenue  deficit  requires  reducing  revenue  expenditure  drastically  which  is  not 
always feasible. Interest obligations take away around 30 percent of total expenditure. Similarly, 
expenditure  on  defense  is  not  to  be  compromised.  So,  if  government  tries  to  reduce 
expenditure it may do so in crucial sector like social services. It is also argued that several items 
expenditure that has been traditionally classified as revenue (current) expenditure are in the 
nature of capital expenditure, designed  to generate future income streams. Thus although 
there can be little doubt regarding the desirability of zero revenue deficits, care must be taken 
that expenditures that bestow widespread benefits (such as social sector) but which are not 
backed by powerful interest groups are not axed. Targeting revenue deficit in the one hand 
protects  capital  spending  on  the  other  hand  can  lead  to  budgetary  distortions.  These  can 
already be observed as states, for example, classify their budgetary support to the power sector 
as equity investments to avoid counting them as revenue expenditures. Reason for targeting the 
fiscal rather than the revenue deficit is the need to cap off-budget borrowing, much of which 
finances  capital  expenditure.  With  capital  expenditures  uncapped,  states  could  continue  to 
bankrupt themselves by shifting capital expenditure, and borrowing for the same, off budget. 
 
Rationale of Targeting Debt-GDP Ratio: A major objective of fiscal policy rule is to reduce public 
debt and stabilize it at a prudent level. Borrowing may need to be constrained because of 
longer-term debt sustainability concerns. A fiscal rule that establishes a medium term limit on 
the gross Debt-GDP ratio can provide a broad gauge of fiscal decency, whereas a rule that seeks 
to  set  year  to  year  debt  ceilings  is  unlikely  to  be  credible  or  operationally  effective.  Since 
measures of public indebtedness (especially as a proportion of GDP) are usually exposed to 
valuation changes and other factors beyond the control of the authorities, they are difficult to 
treat as an annual operational target. It is difficult to calculate true extent of the states’ debt 
burden as states engaged in off-budget activity. The level of outstanding guarantees grew by 
over 40 percent between 1993 and 2000, outstripping the growth in official state level debt. 
Fiscal  activities  are  also  conducted  off-budget  through  various  State-owned  Financial 
Corporation’s (SFCs) and utilities with adverse consequences for their financial health. These off-
budget sources of fiscal activity are contingent liabilities that could result in future claims on 
states’ budgets.  There is a need to go beyond the budget in setting Fiscal Policy Rules (FPR) 
target. There is a need to incorporate off-budget borrowing and the power sector deficit. Some 
states now incur more capital expenditure financed by off-budget borrowing than they do on 
the budget. Since there is an extensive use of off-budget borrowing at the state level, any FPR 
which did not tackle this issue would be creating a huge loophole for the states to walk through. 
The definition of liabilities needed to include not only the total liabilities under the Consolidated 
Fund of the state but also all the items under the Public Account of the state. 
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Institutional Framework under FRBM Act: In India statutory instrument is legislation, mainly 
under the authority of Articles 292 and 293 of the constitution to set limits on borrowing or 
extending guarantees. An additional institutional issue touches the authority responsible for the 
surveillance and enforcement of rules, as well as the associated transparency requirements. In 
India by principle the government is accountable to parliament; the actual surveillance authority 
could  exercise  (on  behalf  of  parliament)  by  the  comptroller  and  Auditor  General,  whose 
functions  are  specified  under  Act  148  of  the  constitution.  Ministry  of  finance  reports  to 
parliament any deviations from obligations under the rules and to propose remedial action.  
 
Transparency under FRBM Act: The FRA adopts certain improvements in fiscal reporting in 
order to take care of quasi–fiscal operations and ensuring better fiscal transparency. The central 
government takes suitable measures to ensure greater transparency in its fiscal operations in 
the public interest and minimize as far as practicable, secrecy in the preparation of the annual 
financial statement and demand for grants. In order to ensure greater transparency in fiscal 
operation in the public interest, the central government at the time of presenting the annual 
financial statements and demands for grant has to make disclosure of any significant change in 
accounting standards, policies and practices affecting  or likely to affect the computation of 
prescribed fiscal indicators, statement of receivables and guarantees and a statement of assets. 
 
Fiscal Policy Statement to be laid before Parliament under FRBM Act: The central government 
has to lay the statement on medium-term fiscal policy Statement, the macroeconomic frame 
work statement and the fiscal policy statement in each financial year. The medium-term fiscal 
policy statement has to set forth a three year rolling target for four fiscal indicators via, revenue 
deficit as per cent of GDP, fiscal deficit as per cent of GDP, tax revenue as percentage of GDP, 
total outstanding liabilities of the central government as percentage of GDP. The medium-term 
fiscal policy statement has to include an assessment of sustainability relating to the balance 
between revenue receipt and expenditure. Ministry of Finance shall review, every quarter; the 
trends in receipts and expenditure in relation to the budget and place before both houses. It has 
to also include an assessment of sustainability relating to the use of capital receipts including 
market borrowing for generating productive assets. The fiscal policy strategy Statement shall 
contain the policies of central government for the ensuring financial year relating to taxation, 
expenditure,  market  borrowings  and  other  liabilities,  lending  and  investment,  pricing  of 
administered  goods  and  services,  securities  and  description  of  other  activities  such  as 
underwriting and guarantees which have potential budgetary implications.  It has to also contain 
the key fiscal measures and rationale for any major deviation in fiscal measures pertaining to 
taxation, subsidy, expenditure, administered pricing and borrowings. An evaluation as to how 
the current policies of the central government are in conformity with the fiscal management 
principles has to be in it. Fiscal policy strategy Statement will contain the intra year bench marks 
for  assessing  the  trends  in  receipts  and  expenditure  relating  annual  targets  and  budget 
estimates.  It  has  to  contain  the  strategic  priorities  of  the  central  government  for  ensuring 
financial year in the fiscal area. The macroeconomic framework statement has to contain an 
assessment  relating  to  the  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP),  the  fiscal  balance  of  the  union  
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government (revenue balance and gross fiscal balance) and the external sector balance of the 
economy reflected in the current account balance of the balance of payments. 
 
Enforceability under FRBM Act: Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) is in terms of compliance at 
stages  of  both  budget  approval  (ex-  ante)  and  budget  execution  (ex-post).  Further  ex-ante 
compliance  in  terms  of  actual  performance  is  contemplated  not  only  ex-post  (end  of  year 
performance), but also contemporaries (intra year).  
 
Exclusion Clause under FRBM Act: An escape or exclusion clause, in non performance of the 
contract if a certain specified condition occurs. In the context of Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) 
for government, government can deviate from the pre specified fiscal targets such as revenue 
deficit and fiscal deficit if there are unforeseen demands on the finances of the Government 
arising  out  of  internal  disturbances  or  natural  calamity  or  such  exceptional  grounds  as  the 
government specify. 
 
Following the footsteps of the central government and the recommendations of the Twelfth 
Finance  Commission
5,  all  state  governments, except  Sikkim  and West  Bengal,  have  enacted 
Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs). 
 
5. Impact of FRBM on Fiscal Balance 
 
No  doubt  FRBM  Act is  an  important  development in managing  Centre and  States  finances. 
Recently  after  the  implementation  of  FRBM  Act  Central  Government  major  fiscal  deficit 
indicators showing a declining trend.  
 
The fiscal deficit of the central government, as a proportion of GDP, declined from 6.6 per cent 
in 1990-91 to 4.1 percent in 1996-97, but this progress could not sustained and in 2001-02 it 
increased to 6.18 percent. After that, there is a fall in fiscal deficit relative to GDP. A similar 
profile is observed in the case of revenue deficit, which after declining from 3.3 per cent of GDP 
in 1990-91 to 2.4 percent in 1996-97, rose steadily to 4.4 percent in 2001-02. Further, increase 
in the ratio of fiscal deficit to GDP during this period was also associated with an increase in the 
proportion of revenue deficit, which increased from 49.4 percent of fiscal deficit in 1990-91 to 
79.7 percent in 2003-04.  
 
                                                 
5 The Twelfth Finance Commission (2004) recommendations aimed to alleviate states’ fiscal distress by (i) 
raising the share of central government revenue (from 29.5 to 30.5 percent) and the amount of grants 
received by states, (ii) conditional debt restructuring and interest rate relief, provided that the states pass 
and implement FRLs targeting revenue balance by 2008/09 and a 3 percent of GDP overall deficit by 
2009/10, (iii) a stricter borrowing ceiling with the center setting global ceilings on borrowing and only 
lending to fiscally weak states. 
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After the implementation of FRBM Act the fiscal situation seems to have improved both in terms 
of fiscal deficit as well as in revenue deficit. In the era of fiscal consolidation the revenue deficit 
of the centre declined to 1.11 percent of GDP in 2007-08, its lowest level since 1990-91.  In 
2008-09, there was a total reversal of fiscal correction with the revenue deficit reaching a level 
of 4.53 percent of GDP.  
 
Figure 1 Central Government: Trends in Major Deficit Indicator (as a percent of GDP) 
Trends in Central Govt: Major Deficit Indicators ( as a per cent of GDP)
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Source:   Hand book of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI Annual policy Statement and RBI bulletin, (various 
issues) 
 
The  Union  Budget  for  2009-10,  which  was  formulated  against  the  backdrop  of  the  global 
downturn and subdued domestic demand, envisaged a revenue deficit of 4.83 percent of GDP.  
The fiscal deficit of the centre declined from 4.48 percent of GDP in 2003-04 to 2.69 percent in 
2007-08, the lowest since 1990-91. There was a reversal of the declining trend in 2008-09, with 
the fiscal deficit ballooning to 6.14 percent of GDP. For 2009-10, it has been budgeted at 6.85 
percent of GDP. 
Table 1  Adjustment in Central Government Finances, 2003-2009-10 (as per cent of GDP) 
Indicators  2003/4  2004/5  2005/6  2006/7  2007/8  2008/9(RE)  2009/10(BE) 
1. Revenue  
 Receipts (a+b)  9.6  9.7  9.7  10.5  11.47  10.56  10.49 
(a) Tax Revenue  
(net of States Share)  6.8  7.1  7.5  8.5  9.3  8.76  8.10 
(b) Non Tax revenue  2.8  2.6  2.2  2.0  2.2  1.8  2.4 
2. Revenue Expenditure  13.1  12.2  12.3  12.4  12.6  15.1  15.3 
(a) Interest Payments   4.5  4  3.7  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.8 
(b) Major Subsidies  1.61  1.46  1.32  1.38  1.50  2.43  1.90 
3.Revenue Deficit (2-1)  3.6  2.5  2.6  1.9  1.1  4.53  4.83 
4. Capital Expenditure   3.96  3.62  1.85  1.67  2.50  1.83  2.11 
5. Total Expenditure (2+4)  17.1  15.8  14.11  14.13  15.1  16.93  17.43 
6. Fiscal Deficit   4.5  4  4.1  3.5  2.7  6.14  6.85 
8. Primary Deficit   -0.03  -0.05  -0.38  -0.19  -0.93  2.5  3.00 
9. Outstanding  Liabilities  63.05  63.33  63.13  61.23  60.07  58.93  59.68 
Source: Economic Survey, (2008-09) & Government of India (2010) “Report of the Thirteenth Finance commission”, 
2010-2015, Ministry of Finance, June, New Delhi 
BE: Budget Estimate, RE: Revised Estimate  
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By looking into the data we can say that the improvement in fiscal deficit indicators at central 
level is due to improvement in revenue receipts (tax receipts) and mainly due to expenditure 
cut. It can be observed that at central level among expenditure there is a heavy deterioration in 
the capital expenditure, where as among revenue expenditure (like interest payments, pension) 
there are not much changes. Fiscal Policy Rules should also take capital expenditure as a major 
indicator of growth and priority should be given for increasing this expenditure rather than 
cutting it off in the fiscal consolidation process. Target variables should be chosen in such a way 
that social sector and capital spending do not suffer in the course of adjustment. 
 
In the recent period after the Implementation of FRL, a significant development in respect of 
state finances is observed. Continuing the fiscal correction and consolidation process, in 2007-08 
there was a surplus in the revenue account after a gap of two decades.  
 
Figure 2 Aggregate States’: Trends in Major Deficit Indicators (as a per cent of GDP) 
Trends in Aggregate States' Deficit Indicators
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Source:   Hand book of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI Annual policy Statement and RBI bulletin, (various 
issues) 
 
The improvement in States finances during the recent years owes a great extent to the various 
fiscal reforms, viz., implementation of FRLs, introduction of VAT, imposition of new taxes and 
measures  to  improve  tax  administration,  measures  aimed  at  limiting  non-development 
expenditure, etc. The larger devolution and transfer of resources from the Central Government 
backed  by  strong  macroeconomic  growth  also  aided  the  fiscal  correction  and  consolidation 
process at the States Government level.   
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Table 2   States’ Government Aggregate: Fiscal Adjustment 2003/04-2008/09 
 Indicators  2003/4  2004/5  2005/6  2006/7  2007/8 
2008/9 
(BE) 
2009/10  
(RE) 
I.  Total Revenue  11.2  11.5  11.99  12.9  13.2  13.87  13.6 
A. State own Revenue  7  7.25  7.24  7.73  7.70  7.70  7.60 
i). State Own Tax  5.6  5.8  5.9  6.1  6.07  6.21  6.27 
ii). State Own Non Tax   1.4  1.47  1.3  1.62  1.63  1.50  1.33 
B. Transfers from Centre  4.1  4.2  4.7  5.2  5.5  6.16  6 
i). Tax Share  2.4  2.5  2.65  2.9  3.2  3.26  3.17 
2. Grant in Aid  1.7  1.7  2.1  2.27  2.29  2.9  2.83 
II. Revenue Expenditure  13.5  12.7  12.2  12.2  12.3  13.6  14.09 
III. Capital Expenditure    1.88  2.14  2.32  2.47  2.8  2.6 
IV. Revenue Deficit  2.3  1.2  0.19  -0.77  -0.94  -0.27  0.5 
V. Gross Fiscal Deficit  4.4  3.4  2.56  1.69  1.51  2.64  3.23 
VI. Primary Deficit  1.5  0.65  0.2  -0.6  -0.61  0.68  1.28 
VII. State Government 
Outstanding Liabilities  33.2  32.7  32.6  30.2  27.8  27.27  na 
VIII. State Government 
Outstanding Guaranties  7.5  8  6.5  5.5  3.7     na 
Source: Economic survey 2008-09, Government of India (2010), “Report of the Thirteenth Finance Commission”, 
Ministry of Finance, 20010-15 New Delhi 
BE: Budget Estimate, RE: Revised Estimate, na: not available 
 
The state Governments may pursue their efforts for improving revenue collection from non-tax 
resources, ensuring the quantity and quality of major expenditure heads, reducing recourse to 
borrowed funds for financing expenditure and enhancing devolution of resources to the local 
Government  level.  The  states  Governments  may  have  to  design  post-FRL  architecture  after 
assessing their performance under the rule-based framework. There is a need to go beyond the 
budget in setting FPR targets, in particular to incorporate off-budget borrowing, by States level 
public sector undertakings and power sector deficit. Contingent liabilities should be capped, but 
in  addition  off  budget  borrowing,  where  debt  serving  will  fall  to  government,  should  be 
consolidated with on budget borrowing. 
 
The impact of FRBM Act on fiscal indicators can be examined through empirical method. 
 
Empirical Measurement of the Impact Of FRBM Act On Fiscal Deficit 
FRBM was implemented to bring fiscal balance.  An attempt has been done to examine whether the 
enactment of FRBM has brought the fiscal balance in terms of reduction in Fiscal Deficit to GDP 
ratio. 
   
The data have been collected from secondary sources from Hand Book of Statistics on Indian 
Economy 2009 published by Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Government of India. The yearly time 
series data have been taken for the period from 1980-81 to 2008-09. 
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Model Design    
Simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method has been applied to examine the impact of FRBM Act 
on fiscal balance.  Fiscal deficit to GDP ratio has been taken as the indicator of for fiscal balance. The 
study regress Fiscal Deficit to GDP (at market price) ratio against GDP (at factor cost) growth rate, 
Population growth and FRBM to find out the impact of FRBM Act on fiscal balance. 
 
Fiscal Deficit =   (Revenue Receipt + Capital Receipt) - Total Expenditure 
Revenue Receipt and Capital Receipt   = f (Gross Domestic Product) 
Expenditure = f (Population)  
 
So here Fiscal Deficit to Gross Domestic Product is a function of Gross Domestic Product Growth 
Rate, Population Growth Rate and FRBM: 
 
FD/GDP =f {GDFC, PG, FRBM} 
 
Symbolically, the model can be written as:  
 
FD_GDP= a0 + a1GDPFCG t + a2 PG t +a3 FRBM +ut    (1) 
Here: 
FD_GDP = Gross Fiscal Deficit / GDP (at market price); 
GDP= Gross Domestic Product at Market Price; 
GDFCG = Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate at Factor Cost; 
PG = Population Growth Rate. 
 
FRBM (here FRBM is dummy is taken as 1 for year which have FRBM and 0 is for other years). 
 
Table 3   Empirical result of the measurement of FRBM Act on Fiscal Deficit to GDP ratio 
Dependent Variable: FD_GDP 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 1981 2008   
Included observations: 28 after adjustments   
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C  0.022764  0.030075  0.756905  0.4568 
GDPFCG  -0.001477  0.000651  -2.269374*  0.0329 
PG  0.013107  0.013434  0.975692  0.3394 
FRBM  -0.004358  0.008335  -0.522797  0.6061 
FD_GDP(-1)  0.650711  0.136409  4.770293  0.0001 
R-squared  0.701105      Mean dependent var  0.077248 
Adjusted R-squared  0.649123      S.D. dependent var  0.015142 
S.E. of regression  0.008969      Akaike info criterion  -6.429602 
Sum squared resid  0.001850      Schwarz criterion  -6.191708 
Log likelihood  95.01442      F-statistic  13.48752 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.266538      Prob(F-statistic)  0.000008 
Note: FRBM dummy (FRBM) taken as 1 for years which has FRBM other years 0 
* Indicates the t values are significant at 1 percent level 
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The study regress FD_GDP on GDPFCG, PG and FRBM to find out impact of FRBM act on fiscal 
balance in India. The model uses OLS technique, but the result can be considered by taking the 
goodness of fit of R
2, adjusted R
2 and Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic. The DW statistics is 2.26, 
which means there is absence of auto correlation in the error term. The R
2 and adjusted R
2 of 
this model is 0.70 and 0.64 respectively. Therefore we consider the model reported in table 3 for 
our analysis.    
 
The empirical analysis find out that FRBM Act does not have a significant effect on the Gross 
Fiscal deficit (GFD) to GDP ratio though the calculated (t) value is not significant for FRBM and it 
is only -0.523 which is less than the 2.  Here GDP (at factor cost) growth rate has a significant 
negative effect on the GFD to GDP ratio though the calculated (t) value is (-2.27) which is greater 
than 2. It means when GDP (at factor cost) growth rate is increasing fiscal deficit to GDP ratio is 
declining.  Population growth does not have a significant effect on Gross Fiscal deficit to GDP 
ratio though the calculated (t) value is 0.97 which is less than 2. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
After the implementation of FRBM Act central and government major fiscal deficit indicators 
showing a declining trend. The improvement at central level is due to slight improvement in 
revenue receipts (tax receipts) and mainly due to expenditure cut. It can be observed that 
among expenditure there is a heavy deterioration in the capital expenditure, where as among 
revenue expenditure (like interest payments, pension) there is not much changes. Fiscal Policy 
Rules should also take care of capital expenditure as it is a major indicator of growth and priority 
should  be  given  for  increasing  this  expenditure  rather  than  cutting  it  off  in  the  fiscal 
consolidation process. Target variables should be chosen in such a way that social sector and 
capital spending do not suffer in the course of adjustment.  
 
No doubt  FRBM Act has been proved as an important development in managing Centre and 
States finances but this improvement may not be sustainable because mere implementation of 
FRBM Act cannot solve the problem further improvement is require in terms of target variable, 
in terms of coverage in terms of procedure and transparency.   
 
FRBM Act is lacking clear accounting definitions for target fiscal indicator. It has allowed creative 
accounting as reflected by the issuance of off-budget bonds to finance subsidies, which have 
thus been excluded from the definition of the FRBMA relevant deficit variable. So care must be 
taken to bring to capture off budget borrowing. Numerical targets under FRBM have not been 
supported  by  comprehensive  expenditure  reform  plans.  FRBM  has  emphasized  on  current 
balance target. This allows weaknesses in budget classification to be exploited, by misclassifying 
current  expenditures  as  capital  expenditures.  Targeting  the  current  balance  may  also  bias 
spending against education and health, which have a large current expenditure component. 
Focus on current deficit type targets such as the current balance are more likely to reduce 
incentives  for  fiscal  savings  in  good  times,  and  to  force  adjustment  in  bad  times  (i.e.  
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procyclicality).  Numerical  targets  under  FRBM  have  not  been  supported  by  comprehensive 
expenditure  reform  plans.    Despite  rapid  economic  growth  and  buoyant  revenues,  India’s 
inability to contain expenditure growth led to modest declines in the general government debt. 
Since the enactment of the FRBMA, general government debt fell by only 7-8 per cent of GDP 
and, at 80 percent of GDP, is high by emerging markets standards.  
 
Our empirical result find out that FRBM act does not have a significant effect on the Gross Fiscal 
deficit (GFD) to GDP ratio where as GDP (at factor cost) growth rate has a significant negative 
effect on the GFD to GDP ratio.  Population growth does not have a significant effect on Gross 
Fiscal deficit to GDP ratio.  
 
FRBM Act in India need to be accompanied by an overarching structural reform effort covering 
intergovernmental  fiscal  relations,  public  sector  employment,  subsidies,  and  the  financial 
system.  For  achieving  transparency  clarity  in  institutional  arrangements  (intergovernmental 
fiscal relations, relations between the government and the so-called public accounts, relations 
between the government and public utilities), in fiscal reporting (including timely, accurate and 
comprehensive financial statements) and in accounting (in particular through accruals-based 
treatment). In India sharing of tax powers between Central and state Government is also a 
source  of  complexity  and  the  expenditure  framework  needs  to  be  strengthened  by  clearly 
distinguishing  between  current  and  capital  spending  and  by  placing  more  emphasis  on 
performance audit. 
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